GIORGIO AGAMBEN - Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy

PART THREE
Potentiality


§ 12 The Passion of Facticity
The Absent "Mood" (Stimmung)
It has often been observed that the problem of love is absent from Heidegger's thought. In Being and Time, which contains ample treatments of fear, anxiety, and Stimmungen in general, love is mentioned only once, in a note referring to Pascal and Augustine. Thus W. Koepps, 1 in 1928, and Ludwig Binswanger, 2 in 1942, reproached Heidegger for not having included love in his analytic of Dasein, which is founded solely on "care" (Sorge); and in a Notiz that is undoubtedly hostile, Karl Jaspers wrote that Heidegger's philosophy is "without love, hence also unworthy of love in its style." 3
Such critiques, as Karl Löwith has remarked, 4 remain fruitless as long as they do not succeed in replacing Heidegger's analytic with an analytic centered on love. Nevertheless, Heidegger's silence--or apparent silence--on love remains problematic. We know that between 1923 and 1926, while Heidegger was preparing his greatest work, he was involved in a passionate relationship with Hannah Arendt, who was at this time his student in Marburg. Even if the letters and poems in the Deutsches Literaturarchiv in Marbach that bear witness to this relationship are not yet accessible, we know from Hannah Arendt herself that, twenty years after the end of their relationship, Heidegger stated that it had been "the passion of his life" (dies nun einmal die Passion des Lebens gewesen sei) and that Being and Time had thus been composed under the sign of love. 5
How, then, is it possible to explain the absence of love from the analytic of Dasein? It is all the more perplexing if one considers that on Hannah Arendt's part, the relationship produced precisely a book on love. I am referring to her Doktordissertation (published in 1929), The Concept of Love in St. Augustine, in which it is not difficult to discern Heidegger's influence. Why does Being and Time remain so obstinately silent on the subject of love?
Let us closely examine th1e note on love in Being and Time. It is to be found in §29, which is dedicated to the analysis of "state-of-mind" (Befindlichkeit) and "moods" (Stimmungen). The note does not contain even one word by Heidegger; it is composed solely of two citations. The first is from Pascal: "And thence it comes about that in the case where we are speaking of human things, it is said to be necessary to know them before we love them, and this has become a proverb; but the saints, on the contrary, when they speak of divine things, say that we must love them before we know them, and that we enter into truth only by charity; they have made of this one of their most useful maxims." The second is from Augustine: "One does not enter into truth except though charity" (Non intramur in veritatem, nisi per charitatem). 6 The two citations suggest a kind of ontological primacy of love as access to truth.
Thanks to the publication of Heidegger's last Marburg lectures from the summer semester of 1928, we know that the reference to this fundamental role of love originated in conversations with Max Scheler on the problem of intentionality. " Scheler first made it clear," Heidegger writes, "especially in the essay 'Liebe und Erkenntnis,' that intentional relations are quite diverse, and that even, for example, love and hatred ground knowing [Lieben und Haß das Erkennen fundieren]. Here Scheler picks up a theme of Pascal and Augustine." 7 In both the essay cited by Heidegger and a text of the same time published posthumously under the title Ordo amoris, Scheler repeatedly insists on the preeminent status of love. "Before he is an ens cogitans or an ens volans," we read in Ordo amoris, "man is an ens amans." Heidegger was thus perfectly conscious of the fundamental importance of love, in the sense that it conditions precisely the possibility of knowledge and the access to truth.
On the other hand, in the lectures of the 1928 summer course, love is referred to in the context of a discussion of the problem of intentionality in which Heidegger criticizes the established notion of intentionality as a cognitive relation between a subject and object. This text is precious since it demonstrates how Heidegger, through a critique that does not spare his teacher, Husserl, overcame the notion of intentionality and ar rived at the structure of transcendence that Being and Time calls Beingin-the-world.
For Heidegger, what remains unexplained in the conception of intentionality as a relation between a subject and an object is precisely what is in need of explanation, that is, the relation itself:
The vagueness of the relation falls back on the vagueness of that which stands in relation. . . . The most recent attempts conceive the subject-object relation as a "being relation" [Seinsbeziehung]. . . . Nothing is gained by the phrase "being relation," as long as it is not stated what sort of being is meant, and as long as there is vagueness about the sort of being [Seinsart] of the beings between which this relation is supposed to obtain. . . . Being, even with Nicolai Hartmann and Max Scheler, is taken to mean being-on-hand [Vorhandensein]. This relation is not nothing, but it is still not being as something on hand. . . . One of the main preparatory tasks of Being and Time is to bring this "relation" radically to light in its primordial essence and to do so with full intent. 8
For Heidegger, the subject-object relation is less original than the selftranscendence of Being-in-the-world by which Dasein opens itself to the world before all knowledge and subjectivity. Before the constitution of anything like a subject or an object, Dasein--according to one of the central theses of Being and Time--is already open to the world: "knowing is grounded beforehand in a Being-already-alongside-the-world [Schon-Seinbei-der-Welt]." 9 And only on the basis of this original transcendence can something like intentionality be understood in its own mode of Being.
If Heidegger therefore does not thematically treat the problem of love, although recognizing its fundamental status, it is precisely because the mode of Being of an opening that is more original than all knowledge (and that takes place, according to Scheler and Augustine, in love) is, in a certain sense, the central problem of Being and Time. On the other hand, if it is to be understood on the basis of this opening, love can no longer be conceived as it is commonly represented, that is, as a relation between a subject and an object or as a relation between two subjects. It must, instead, find its place and proper articulation in the Being-already-in-theworld that characterizes Dasein's transcendence.
But what is the mode of Being of this Being-already-in-the-world? In what sense is Dasein always already in the world and surrounded by things before even knowing them? How is it possible for Dasein to open itself to something without thereby making it into the objective correlate of a knowing subject? And how can the intentional relation itself be brought to light in its specific mode of Being and its primacy with respect to subject and object?
It is in this context that Heidegger introduces his notion of "facticity" (Faktizität).
Facticity and Dasein
The most important contribution made by the publication (which has barely begun) of Heidegger's lecture courses from the early 1920s consists in decisively showing the centrality of the notions of facticity and factical life (faktisches Leben) in the development of Heidegger's thought. The abandonment of the notion of intentionality (and of the concept of subject that was its correlate) was made possible by the establishment of this category. The path taken here was the following: intentionality-facticityDasein. One of the future tasks of Heideggerian philology will no doubt be to make this passage explicit and to determine its genealogy (as well as to explain the progressive eclipse of the concept of facticity in Heidegger's later thought). The observations that follow are only a first contribution in this direction.
First of all, it must be said that Heidegger's first students and friends long ago emphasized the importance of the concept of facticity in the formation of Heidegger's thought. As early as 1927, in a work that appeared as the second half of the Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologiscbe Forschung in which the first edition of Being and Time was published, the mathematician and philosopher Oskar Becker wrote, " Heidegger gives the name of ontology to the hermeneutics of facticity, that is, the interpretation of human Dasein." 10 Becker is referring here to the title of Heidegger's 1923 summer-semester course held in Freiburg, "Ontology, or Hermeneutics of Facticity." 11 What does this title mean? In what sense is ontology, the doctrine of Being, a doctrine of facticity?
The references to Husserl and Sartre that one finds in philosophical dictionaries under the heading "Facticity" are misleading here, for Heidegger's use of the term is fundamentally different from theirs. Heidegger distinguishes Dasein's Faktizität from Tatsächlichkeit, the simple factuality of intraworldly beings. At the start of his Ideas, Husserl defines the Tatsächlichkeit of the objects of experience. These objects, Husserl writes, appear as things found at determinate points in space and time that pos sess a certain content of reality but that, considered in their essence, could also be elsewhere and otherwise. Husserl thus insists on contingency (Zufälligkeit) as an essential characteristic of factuality. For Heidegger, by contrast, the proper trait of facticity is not Zufälligkeit but Verfallenheit. Everything is complicated, in Heidegger, by the fact that Dasein is not simply, as in Sartre, thrown into the "there" of a given contingency; instead, Dasein must rather itself be its "there," be the "there" (Da) of Being. Once again, the difference in modes of Being is decisive here.
The origin of the Heideggerian use of the term "facticity" is most likely to be found not in Husserl but in Augustine, who writes that facticia est anima, 12 "the human soul is facticia," in the sense that it was "made" by God. In Latin, facticius is opposed to nativus; it means qui non sponte fit, what is not natural, what did not come into Being by itself ("what is made by hand and not by nature," as one finds in the dictionaries). The term must be understood in all its force, for it is the same adjective that Augustine uses to designate pagan idols, in a sense that seems to correspond perfectly to our term "fetish": genus facticiorum deorum, the nature of "factical" gods.
If one wants to understand the development of the concept of facticity in Heidegger's thought, one should not forget this origin of the word, which ties it to the semantic sphere of non-originarity and making. What is important here is that for Heidegger, this experience of facticity, of a constitutive non-originarity, is precisely the original experience of philosophy, the only legitimate point of departure for thinking.
One of the first appearances of this meaning of the term faktisch is to be found (as far as one can judge from the present state of Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe) in the 1921 summer course on Augustine and Neoplatonism, which Otto Pöggeler and Oskar Becker have summarized. 13 Here Heidegger seeks to show that primitive Christian faith (as opposed to Neoplatonic metaphysics, which conceives of Being as a stets Vorhandenes and considers fruitio dei, 14 consequently, to be the rapture of an eternal presence) was an experience of life in its facticity and essential restlessness (Unruhe). As an example of this "factical experience of life" (faktische Lebenserfahrung), Heidegger analyzes a passage from chapter 23 of Book 10 of the Confessions, where Augustine questions man's relation to truth:
I have known many men who wished to deceive, but none who wished to be deceived. . . . Because they hate to be deceived themselves, but are glad if they can deceive others, they love the truth when it reveals itself but hate it when it reveals them [cum se ipsa indicat . . . cum eos ipsos indicat]. They reap their just reward, for those who do not wish to stand condemned by the truth find themselves unmasked against their will and also find that truth is veiled for them. This is precisely the behaviour of the human heart. In its blind inertia, in its abject shame, it loves to lie concealed, yet it wishes that nothing should be concealed from it [latere vult se autem ut lateat aliquid non vult]. Its reward is just the opposite of its desire, for it cannot conceal itself from the truth, but truth remains hidden in it [ipse non lateat veritatem, ipsum autem veritas lateat]. 15
What interests Heidegger here as a mark of factical experience is this dialectic of concealment and unconcealment, this double movement by which whoever wants to know everything while remaining concealed in knowledge is known by a knowledge that is concealed from him. Facticity is the condition of what remains concealed in its opening, of what is exposed by its very retreat. From the beginning, facticity is thus characterized by the same cobelonging of concealment and unconcealment that, for Heidegger, marks the experience of the truth of Being.
The same movement, the same restlessness of facticity was at the center of Heidegger's lectures for the Freiburg winter course of 1921-22, which bore the title "Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle." This course was to a large degree dedicated to the analysis of what Heidegger later called "factical life" (das faktische Leben), which still later would become Dasein. In the lectures Heidegger begins by describing the original and irreducible character of facticity for thought:
[The determinations of factical life] are not indifferent qualities that can be harmlessly established, as when I say, "this thing is red." They are alive in facticity, that is, they enclose factical possibilities of which they can never be freed--never, thank God [God sei Dank nie]. As a consequence, to the degree that it is authentic, a philosophical interpretation directed toward what is most important [die Hauptsache] in philosophy, facticity, is itself factical; and it is factical in such a way that, as philosophico-factical, it radically gives itself possibilities of decision and thus itself. But it can do so only if it exists, in the guise of its Dasein [wenn sie da ist--in der Weise ihres Daseins]. 16
Far from signifying the immobility of a factual situation (as in Sartre or Husserl), facticity designates the "character of Being" (Seinscharakter) and "e-motion" (Bewegtheit) proper to life. The analysis Heidegger sketches here constitutes a kind of prehistory of the analytic of Dasein 17 and the self-transcendence of Being-in-the-world, whose fundamental determinations are all to be found here under different names. For factical life is never in the world as a simple object: "the e-motion [of factical life] is such that, as movement, it gives itself, in itself, to itself; it is the e-motion of factical life that constitutes factical life, such that factical life, insofar as it lives in the world, does not properly speaking produce its movement but, rather, lives in the world as the in-which [worin], the of-which [worauf] and the for-which [wofür] of life." 18
Heidegger calls the "fundamental movement" (Grundbewegung) of facticity Ruinanz (from the Latin ruina, "tumbling," "fall"). This is the first appearance of the concept that will become die Verfallenheit, "falling," in Being and Time. Ruinanz presents the same intertwining of the proper and the improper, the spontaneous and the facticious, as the "thrownness" (Geworfenheit) of Dasein: "a movement that produces itself and that, nevertheless, does not produce itself, producing the emptiness in which it moves; for its emptiness is the possibility of movement." 19 And Heidegger likens facticity, insofar as it expresses the fundamental structure of life, to Aristotle's concept of kinēsis. 20
What had not yet found definite expression in the courses at the start of the 1920s takes on, in Being and Time, the theoretical form that has become familiar to us today. Heidegger introduces the concept of facticity as early as §12, when he defines the "basic constitution" (Grundverfassung) of Dasein. To situate this concept correctly, one must, above all, place it in the context of a distinction between modes of Being. Being-in-theworld, Heidegger says, is not the property of a "present-at-hand" being (ein Vorhandenes) such as, for example, a corporeal thing (Körperding) that is in another thing of the same mode, like water in a glass or clothes in a wardrobe. Instead, Being-in-the-world expresses the very structure of Dasein; it concerns an "existential" and not a "categorial." Two worldless (weltlose) beings can certainly be beside each other (one thus says, for example, that the chair is near the wall), and we can even say that one touches the other. But to speak of touching in the proper sense of the word, for the chair to be truly near the wall (in the sense of Beingalready-alongside-the-world), the chair would have to be able to encounter the wall.
How do matters stand with Dasein, who is not "worldless"? It is important to grasp the conceptual difficulty at issue here. It goes without saying that if Dasein were simply an intraworldly being, it could en counter neither the being it is nor other beings. On the other hand, however, if Dasein were deprived of all factuality, how could it encounter anything? To be near beings, to have a world, Dasein must so to speak be a "fact" (Faktum) without being factual (Vorhandenes); it must both be a "fact" (Faktum) and have a world. It is here that Heidegger introduces the notion of facticity:
Dasein itself . . . [is] present-at-hand "in" the world, or, more exactly, can with some right and within certain limits be taken as merely present-at-hand. To do this, one must completely disregard or just not see the existential state of Being-in [In-Sein]. This latter kind of presence-at-hand becomes accessible not by disregarding Dasein's specific structures but only by understanding them in advance. Dasein understands its ownmost Being in the sense of a certain "factual Being-present-at-hand" [tatsächlichen Vorhandenseins]. And yet the factuality [Tatsächlichkeit] of the fact [Tatsache] of one's own Dasein is at bottom quite different ontologically from the factual occurrence of some kind of mineral, for example. Whenever Dasein is, it is as a Fact; and the factuality of such a Fact is what we shall call Dasein's facticity. This is a definite way of Being [Seinsbestimmtheit], and it has a complicated structure which cannot even be grasped as a problem until Dasein's basic existential states have been worked out. The concept of "facticity" implies that an entity "within-theworld" has Being-in-the-world in such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its "destiny" with the Being of those entities which it encounters within its own world." 21
As far as form is concerned, facticity presents us with the paradox of an existential that is also a categorial and a "fact" (Faktum) that is not factual. Neither "present-at-hand" (vorhanden) nor "ready-to-hand" (zuhanden), neither pure presence nor object of use, facticity is a specific mode of Being, one whose conceptualization marks Heidegger's reformulation of the question of Being in an essential manner. It should not be forgotten that this reformulation is above all a new articulation of the modes of Being.
The clearest presentation of the characteristics of facticity is to be found in §29 of Being and Time, which is devoted to the analysis of "stateof-mind" (Befindlichkeit) and "moods" (Stimmungen). An opening that precedes all knowledge and all lived experience (Erlebnis) takes place in the "state-of-mind": die primäre Entdeckung der Welt, "the original disclosure of the world." But what characterizes this disclosure is not the full light of the origin but precisely irreducible facticity and opacity. Through its "moods," Dasein is brought before other beings and, above all, before what it itself is; but since it does not bring itself there by itself, it is irremediably delivered over to what already confronts it and gazes upon it as an inexorable enigma:
In having a mood, Dasein is always disclosed moodwise as that entity to which it has been delivered over in its Being; and in this way it has been delivered over to the Being which, in existing, it has to be. "To be disclosed" does not mean "to be known as this sort of thing." . . . The pure "that it is" shows itself, but the "whence" and the "whither" remain in darkness. . . . This characteristic of Dasein's Being--this "that it is"--is veiled in its "whence" and "whither," yet disclosed in itself all the more unveiledly; we call it the "thrownness" of this entity into its "there." The expression "thrownness" is meant to suggest the facticity of its being delivered over. . . . Facticity is not the factuality of thefactum brutumof something present-at-hand, but a characteristic of Dasein's Being--one which has been taken up into existence, even if proximally it has been thrust aside [abgedrängt]. 22
Let us pause to consider the traits of this facticity, this factical beingthrown (we have seen that Heidegger leads "thrownness" back to facticity). Its origin and characteristic structure as a category organizing the analytic of Dasein have rarely been considered.
The first trait of facticity is die ausweichende Abkehr, "evasive turningaway." Dasein's openness delivers it over to something that it cannot escape but that nevertheless eludes it and remains inaccessible to it in its constant distraction: "the first essential characteristic of states-of-mind [is] that they disclose Dasein in its thrownness, and--proximally and for the most part--in the manner of an evasive turning-away." 23
A kind of original repression thus belongs to this character of Dasein's Being. The term Heidegger uses, "repressed" (abgedrängt), designates something that has been displaced, pushed back, but not completely effaced, something that remains present in the form of its retreat, as in Freudian "repression" (Verdrängung). 24 But Heidegger expresses the most essential trait of facticity, the trait from which all others derive, in a form that has many variations, even thought it remains constant in its conceptual core: "Dasein is delivered over to the being that it is and must be," "Dasein is and must be its own 'there,'" "Dasein is each time its possibility," "Dasein is the being whose Being is at issue for it in its very Being." What do these formulas mean as expressions of facticity?
Heidegger's 1928 Marburg summer-semester lectures (which often con tain invaluable commentaries on certain crucial passages in Being and Time) explain the matter in absolutely unambiguous terms: "By it [the term 'Dasein'] we designate the being for which its own proper mode of Being in a definite sense is not indifferent," [Dasein] bedeutet das Seiende, dem seine eigene Weise zu sein in einem bestimmten Sinne ungleichgültig ist. 25
Dasein must be its way of Being, its manner, its "guise," we could say, using a word that corresponds etymologically and semantically to the German Weise. 26 We must reflect on this paradoxical formulation, which for Heidegger marks the original experience of Being, without which both the repetition of the "question of Being" (Seinsfrage) and the relation between essence and existence sketched in §9 of Being and Time remain absolutely unintelligible. Here the two fundamental determinations of classical ontology--existentia and essentia, quod est and quid est, Daßsein and Wassein--are abbreviated into a constellation charged with tension. For Dasein (insofar as it is and must be its own "there"), existence and essence, "Being" and "Being such," on and poion are as inseparable as they are for the soul in Plato's Seventh Letter ( 343 b-c).
The "essence" of Dasein lies in its existence. The characteristics that can be exhibited in this entity are not, therefore, present-at-hand "properties" of some present-at-hand entity with particular properties; they are in each case possible ways for it to be, and no more than that. All the Being-as-it-is [So-sein] which this entity possesses is primarily Being. 27
"All the Being-as-it-is [So-sein] which this entity possesses is primarily Being": one must think here not so much of the definition of the ontological status of God (Deus est suum esse, "God is his Being") 28 as of Schelling's positive philosophy and his concept of das Seyende-Sein, "being Being," where the verb "to be" also has a transitive sense; Dasein must be its being-such, it must "existentiate" its essence and "essentialize" its existence. 29
As a "character of Being" (Seinscharakter), facticity thus expresses Dasein's original ontological character. If Heidegger can simultaneously pose the question of the meaning of Being anew and distance himself from ontology, it is because the Being at issue in Being and Time has the character of facticity from the beginning. This is why for Dasein, quality, Sosein, is not a "property" but solely a "possible guise" (mögliche Weise) to be (a formula that must be heard in accordance with the same ontological contraction that is expressed in Nicholas of Cusa's possest). Original opening is produced in this factical movement, in which Dasein must be its Weise, its fashion of Being, and in which Being and its guise are both distinguishable and the same. The term "fashion" must he heard here in its etymological sense (from factio, facere) and in the sense that the word has in Old French: "face," like the English "face." Dasein is factical, since it must be its face, its fashion, its manner--at once what reveals it and that into which it is irreparably thrown.
It is here that one must see the root of ausweichende Abkehr, "evasive turning-away," and of the impropriety constitutive of Dasein. It is because it must be its guise that Dasein remains disguised--hidden away in what opens it, concealed in what exposes it, and darkened by its own light. Such is the factical dimension of this "lighting" (Lichtung), which is truly something like a lucus a non lucendo. 30
Here it is possible to see the full sense in which Heidegger's ontology is a hermeneutics of facticity. Facticity is not added to Dasein; it is inscribed in its very structure of Being. Here we are in the presence of something that could be defined, with an oxymoron, as "original facticity" or Urfaktizität. And it is precisely such an "original facticity" that the 1928 summer lectures call transzendentale Zerstreuung, "transcendental distraction, dispersion, or dissemination," or ursprüngliche Streuung, "original dispersion." I do not want to dwell on these passages, which have already been analyzed by Jacques Derrida. 31 It suffices to recall that here Heidegger sketches the figure of an original facticity that constitutes die innere Möglichkeit für die faktische Zerstreuung in die Leiblichkeit und damit in die Geschlechtlichkeit, "the intrinsic possibility for being factically dispersed into bodiliness and thus into sexuality." 32
Facticity and Fetishism
How are we to understand this original facticity? Is Weise something like a mask that Dasein must assume? Is it here that a Heideggerian ethics finds its proper place?
Here the terms "factical" and "facticity" show their pertinence. The German adjective faktisch, like the French Factice, appeared relatively late in the European lexicon: the German in the second half of the eighteenth century, the French a little earlier. But both terms are, in fact, erudite forms, based on the Latin, which hark back to ancient linguistic history. Thirteenth-century French, in accordance with its phonological laws, thus formed a number of terms on the basis of the Latin faticius, such as the adjective faitis (or faitiche, fetiz) and the noun faitisseté. At the same time, German, perhaps by borrowing the French term, formed the adjective feit. Faitis, like its German counterpart, feit, simply means "beautiful, pretty." In particular, it is used in conformity with its etymological origin to designate that which, in a human body, seems made by design, fashioned with skill, made-for, and which thereby attracts desire and love. 33 It is as if the Being-such of a being, its guise or manner, were separated from it in a kind of paradoxical self-transcendence. It is in the context of this semantic history that one must situate the appearance of the term "fetish" (in German, Fetisch). Dictionaries inform us that the term entered into European languages in the late seventeenth century by means of the Portuguese feitiçio. But the word is in fact morphologically identical to the French faitis, which, through the borrowing from the Portuguese, is thus in some way resurrected.
An analysis of the term's meaning in its Freudian and Marxian senses is particularly instructive from this point of view. Let us recall that for Marx, the fetish character of the commodity, what makes it inappropriable, consists not in its artificial character but rather in the fact that in it a product of human labor is given both a use value and an exchange value. In the same way, for Freud, the fetish is not an inauthentic object. Instead, it is both the presence of something and the sign of its absence; it is and is not an object. And it is as such that it irresistibly attracts desire without ever being able to satisfy it.
One could say that in this sense the structure of Dasein is marked by a kind of original fetishism, Urfetischismus 34 or Urfaktizität, on account of which Dasein cannot ever appropriate the being it is, the being to which it is irreparably consigned. Neither something "present-at-hand" (Vorhandenes) nor something "ready-to-hand" (Zuhandenes), neither exchange value nor use value, Being--which must be its manners of Being--exists in facticity. But for this very reason, its "guises" (Weisen) are not simulacra that it could, as a free subject, assume or not assume. From the beginning, they belong to its existence and originally constitute its ēthos. 35
The Proper and the Improper
This is the perspective from which we must read the unresolved dialectic of eigentlich and uneigentlich, the proper and the improper, to which Heidegger devotes some of the most beautiful pages of Being and Time. We know that Heidegger always specified that the words eigentlich and uneigentlich are to be heard in the etymological sense of "proper" and "improper." On account of its facticity, Dasein's opening is marked by an original impropriety; it is constitutively divided into "propriety" ( Eigentlichkeit) and "impropriety" ( Uneigentlichkeit). Heidegger often emphasizes that the dimension of impropriety and everydayness of the "They" ( das Man) is not something derivative into which Dasein would fall by accident; on the contrary, impropriety is as originary as propriety. Heidegger obstinately reaffirms the original character of this cobelonging: "Because Dasein is essentially falling, its state of Being is such that it is in 'untruth.'" 36
At times, Heidegger seems to retreat from the radicality of this thesis, fighting against himself to maintain a primacy of the proper and the true. But an attentive analysis shows not only that the co-originarity of the proper and the improper is never disavowed, but even that several passages could be said to imply a primacy of the improper. Whenever Being and Time seeks to seize hold of the experience of the proper (as, for example, in proper Being-toward-death), it does so solely by means of an analysis of impropriety (for example, factical Being-toward-death). The factical link between these two dimensions of Dasein is so intimate and original that Heidegger writes, "authentic existence is not something which floats above falling everydayness; existentially, it is only a modified way in which such everydayness is seized upon." 37 And on the subject of proper decision, he states, "resoluteness appropriates untruth authentically." 38
Authentic existence has no content other than inauthentic existence; the proper is nothing other than the apprehension of the improper. We must reflect on the inevitable character of the improper that is implied in these formulations. Even in proper Being-toward-death and proper decision, Dasein seizes hold of its impropriety alone, mastering an alienation and becoming attentive to a distraction. Such is the originary status of facticity. But what does it mean to seize hold of impropriety? How is it possible to appropriate untruth properly? If one does not reflect on these questions and merely attributes to Heidegger a simple primacy of the proper, one will not only fail to understand the deepest intention of the analytic of Dasein; one will equally bar access to the thought of the Ereignis, which constitutes the key word of Heidegger's later thought and which has its "original history" (Urgeschichte), in Benjamin's sense of the term, in the dialectic of the proper and the improper.
Theory of Passions
Let us now return, after this long detour, to the problem of love that was our point of departure. An attentive analysis shows that the statement that Heidegger's thought is "without love" (ohne Liebe) is not only inexact from a philosophical point of view but also imprecise on the philological level. Several texts could be invoked here. I would like to pause to consider the two that strike me as the most important.
Almost ten years after the end of his relationship with Hannah Arendt, in the 1936 lecture course on Nietzsche entitled "The Will to Power as Art," Heidegger thematically treated the problem of love in several very dense pages in which he sketched an altogether singular theory of the passions. He begins by withdrawing passions from the domain of psychology by defining them as "the basic modes that constitute Dasein . . . the ways man confronts the Da, the openness and concealment of beings, in which he stands." 39 Immediately afterward, he clearly distinguishes love and hate from other feelings, positing them as passions (Leidenschaften) as opposed to simple affects (Affekte). While affects such as anger and joy are born and die away in us spontaneously, love and hate, as passions, are always already present and traverse our Being from the beginning. This is why we speak of "nurturing hatred" but not of "nurturing anger" (ein Zorn wird genährt). 40 We must cite at least the decisive passage on passion:
Because hate traverses [durchzieht] our Being more originally, it has a cohesive power; like love, hate brings an original closure [eine ursprüngliche Geschlossenheit] and perdurance to our essential Being. . . . But the persistent closure that comes to Dasein through hate does not close it off and bind it. Rather, it grants vision and premeditation. The angry man loses the power of reflection. He who hates intensifies reflection and rumination to the point of "hardboiled" malice. Hate is never blind; it is perspicacious. Only anger is blind. Love is never blind: it is perspicacious. Only infatuation [Verliebtheit] is blind, fickle, and susceptible--an affect, not a passion [ein Affekt, keine Leidenschaft]. To passion belongs a reaching out and opening up of oneself [das weit Ausereifende, sich Öffnende]. Such reaching out occurs even in hate, since the hated one is pursued everywhere relentlessly. But such reaching out [Aus-griff griff] in passion does not simply lift us up and away beyond ourselves. It gathers our essential Being to its proper ground [auf seinem eigentlichen Grund], it exposes our ground for the first time in so gathering, so that the passion is that through which and in which we take hold of ourselves [in uns selbst Fuß fassen] and achieve lucid mastery of the beings around us and within us [hellsichtig des Seiende um uns und in uns mächtig werden]. 41
Hatred and love are thus the two Grundweisen, the two fundamental guises or manners, through which Dasein experiences the Da, the opening and retreat of the being that it is and must be. In love and hate, as opposed to affects (which are blind to the very thing they reveal and which, like Stimmungen, are only uncovered in distraction), man establishes himself more deeply in that into which he is thrown, appropriating his very facticity and thus gathering together and opening his own ground. It is therefore not an accident that hatred, with its "original closure," is given a primordial rank alongside love (like evil in Heidegger's course on Schelling and fury [das Grimmige] in his "Letter on Humanism"): the dimension at issue here is the original opening of Dasein, in which "there come[s] from Being itself the assignment [Zuweisung] of those directions [Weisungen] that must become law and rule for man." 42
Potentia Passiva
This original status of love (more precisely, of passion) is reaffirmed in a passage in the "Letter on Humanism" whose importance here cannot be overestimated. In this text, "to love" (lieben) is likened to mögen (which means both "to want" and "to be able"), and mögen is identified with Being in a context in which the category of potentiality-possibility is considered in an entirely new fashion:
To embrace a "thing" or a "person" in its essence means to love it [sie lieben], to favor it [sie mögen]. Thought in a more originary way, such favoring [mögen] means to bestow essence as a gift. Such favoring is the proper essence of enabling [Vermögen], which not only can achieve this or that but also can let something essentially unfold [wesen] in its provenance, that is, let it be. It is on the "strength" [kraft] of such enabling by favoring that something is properly able to be. This enabling is what is properly "possible" [das eigentlich "Mögliche"], that whose essence resides in favoring. . . . Being is the enablingfavoring, the "may be." As the element, Being is the "quiet power" of the favoring-enabling, that is, of the possible. Of course, our words möglich and Möglichkeit, under the dominance of "logic" and "metaphysics," are thought solely in contrast to "actuality"; that is, they are thought on the basis of a definite--the metaphysical--interpretation of Being as actus and potentia, a distinction identified with the one between existentia and potentia. When I speak of the "quiet power of the possible" I do not mean the possibile of a merely represented possibilitas, nor potentia as the essentia of an actus of existentia; rather, I mean Being itself. 43
To understand the thematic unity evoked here, it must be considered with respect to the problem of freedom as it is presented in the last pages of "On the Essence of Reasons." Once again, the dimension of facticity (better: of original or transcendental facticity) is essential: "For Dasein, to exist means to behave toward being [Seiendes] while situated in the midst of being [Seiendes]. It means to behave toward being that is not like Dasein, toward itself and toward being like itself, so that what is at issue in its situated behaving is the capacity to be [Seinskönnen] of Dascin itself. The project of world outstrips the possible; the Why arises in this outstripping." 44
Freedom thus reveals Dasein in its essence to be "capable of being, with possibilities that gape open before its finite choice, that is, in its destiny." 45 Insofar as it exists factically (that is, insofar as it must be its manners of Being), Dasein always exists in the mode of the possible: in the excess of possibilities with respect to beings and, at the same time, in a lack of possibilities with respect to them, since its possibilities appear as radical incapacities in the face of the very being to which it is always already consigned.
This cobelonging of capacity and incapacity is analyzed in a passage in the 1928 summer lecture course, which anticipates the themes of "On the Essence of Reasons" in urging the superiority of the category of the possible over the category of the real:
Insofar . . . as freedom (taken transcendentally) constitutes the essence of Dasein, Dasein, as existing, is always, in essence, necessarily "further" than any given factical being. On the basis of this upswing, Dasein is, in each case, beyond beings, as we say, but it is beyond in such a way that it, first of all, experiences beings in their resistance, against which transcending Dasein is powerless. The powerlessness is metaphysical, i.e., to be understood as essential; it cannot be removed by reference to the conquest of nature, to technology, which rages about in the "world" today like an unshackled beast; for this domination of nature is the real proof for the metaphysical powerlessness of Dasein, which can only attain freedom in its history. . . . Only because, in our factical intentional comportment toward beings of every sort, we, outstripping in advance, return to and arrive at beings from possibilities, only for this reason can we let beings themselves be what and how they are. And the converse is true. Because Dasein, as factically existing, transcending already, in each case, encounters beings and because, with transcendence and world-entry, the powerlessness, understood metaphysically, is manifest, for this reason Dasein, which can be powerless (metaphysically) only as free, must hold itself to the condition of the possibility of powerlessness, to the freedom to ground. And it is for this reason that we essentially place every being, as being, into question regarding its ground. We inquire into the why in our comportment toward beings of every sort, because in ourselves possibility is higher than actuality, because with Dasien in itself this being-higher becomes existent. 46
The passage on mögen (and its relation to love) in the "Letter on Humanism" must be read in close relation to this primacy of possibility. The potentia at issue here is essentially potentia passiva, the dynamis tou paskhein whose secret solidarity with active potentiality (dynamis tou poiein) Heidegger emphasized in his 1931 lecture course on Aristotle Metaphysics. All potentiality (dynamis), Heidegger writes in his interpretation of Aristotle, is impotentiality (adynamia), and all capacity (dynamis) is essentially passivity (dekhesthai). 47 But this impotentiality is the place of an original event (Urgeschehen) that determines Dasein's Being and opens the abyss of its freedom: "What does not stand within the power of freedom is that Dasein is a self by virtue of its possibility--a factical self because it is free--and that transcendence comes about as a primordial happening. This sort of powerlessness (thrownness) is not due to the fact that being infects Dasein; rather, it defines the very Being of Dasein as such." 48
Passion, potentia passiva, is therefore the most radical experience of possibility at issue in Dasein: a capacity that is capable not only of potentiality (the manners of Being that are in fact possible) but also, and above all, of impotentiality. This is why for Dasein, the experience of freedom coincides with the experience of impotentiality, which is situated at the level of the original facticity or "original dispersion" (ursprüngliche Streuung), which, according to the 1928 summer course, constitutes the "inner possibility" of Dasein's factical dispersion.
As passive potentiality and Mögen, passion is capable of its own impotentiality; it lets be not only the possible but also the impossible, thus gathering together Dasein in its ground, to open it and, possibly, to allow it to master what exists in it and around it. In this sense, the "immobile force of the possible" is essentially passion, passive potentiality: mögen (to be able) is lieben (to love).
But how can such mastery take place if it appropriates not a thing but simply impotentiality and impropriety? How is it possible to be capable not of possibility and potentiality but of an impossibility and impotentiality? What is freedom that is above all passion?
The Passion of Facticity
Here the problem of love, as passion, shows its proximity to that of the Ereignis, which constitutes the central motif of Heidegger's thought from the 1940s onward. Love, as passion of facticity, may be what makes it possible to cast light on the concept of the Ereignis. We know that Heidegger explains the word Ereignis on the basis of the term eigen and understands it as "appropriation," situating it with respect to Being and Time's dialectic of eigentlich and uneigentlich. But here it is a matter of an appropriation in which what is appropriated is neither something foreign that must become proper nor something dark that must be illuminated. What is appropriated here and brought not to light but to "lighting" (Lichtung) is solely an expropriation, an occultation as such. "Appropriation is in itself expropriation. This word contains in a manner commensurate with Appropriation the early Greek lēthē in the sense of concealing" (Das Ereignis ist in ihm selbst Enteignis, in welches Wort die frühgriechische lêthê im Sinne des Verbergens ereignishaft aufgenommen ist). 49 The thought of the Ereignis is thus "not an extinguishing of the oblivion of Being, but placing oneself in it and standing within it. Thus the awakening [erwachen] from the oblivion of Being to the oblivion of Being is the unawakening [entwachen] into Appropriation." 50 What now takes place is that concealment no longer conceals itself but becomes "the attention of thinking" (die Verbergung sich nicht verbirgt, ihr gilt vielmehr das Aufmerksam des Denkens). 51
What do these enigmatic sentences mean? If what human beings must appropriate here is not a hidden thing but the very fact of hiddenness, Dasein's very impropriety and facticity, then "to appropriate it" can only be to be properly improper, to abandon oneself to the inappropriable. Withdrawal, lēthē, must come to thinking as such; facticity must show itself in its concealment and opacity.
The thought of the Ereignis, insofar as it is the end of the history of Being, is therefore in a certain sense also a repetition and completion of the thought of facticity that, in the early Heidegger, marked the reformulation of the "question of Being" (Seinsfrage). Here it is an issue not simply of the many manners ( Weisen) of Dasein's factical existence but of the original facticity (or transcendental dispersion) that constitutes its "inner possibility" (innere Möglichkeit). The Mögen of this Möglichkeit is neither potentiality nor actuality, neither essence nor existence; it is, rather, an impotentiality whose passion, in freedom, opens the ground of Dasein. In the Ereignis, original facticity no longer retreats, either in distracted dispersion or historical destiny, but is instead appropriated in its very distraction and borne in its lēthē.
The dialectic of the proper and the improper thus reaches its end. Dasein no longer has to be its own Da and no longer has to be its own Weisen: by now, it definitively inhabits them in the mode of the "dwelling" (Wohnen) that in §12 of Being and Time characterized Dasein's Being-in (In-Sein).
In the word Ereignis, we should therefore hear the Latin assuescere, "accustoming," on the condition of thinking the "suus" in this term, the "self" (se) that constitutes its core. And if one remembers that the origin of Dasein's destinal character was (according to §9 of Being and Time) its "having to be," it is also possible to understand why the Ereignis is without destiny, geschickslos. Here Being (the possible) has truly exhausted its historical possibilities, and Dasein, who is capable of its own incapacity, attains its own extreme manner: the immobile force of the possible.
This does not mean that all facticity is abolished and that all e-motion is effaced. "The lack of destiny of Appropriation does not mean that it has no 'e-motion' [Bewegtheit]. Rather, it means that the manner of movement most proper to Appropriation, turning toward us in withdrawal [ Zuwendung in Entzug], first shows itself as what is to be thought." 52 This is the sense of the Gelassenheit, the "abandonment," that a late text defines as die Offenheit für das Geheimnis, "the openness to the mystery": 53 Gelassenheit is the e-motion of the Ereignis, the eternally nonepochal opening to the "ancient something [Uralte] which conceals itself in the word a-lētheia." 54
We may now approach a provisional definition of love. What man introduces into the world, his "proper," is not simply the light and opening of knowledge but above all the opening to concealment and opacity. Alētheia, truth, is the safeguard of lēthē, nontruth; memory, the safeguard of oblivion; light, the safeguard of darkness. It is only in the insistence of this abandonment, in this safeguarding, which is forgetful of everything, that something like knowledge and attention can become possible.
Love suffers all of this (in the etymological sense of the word passion, pati, paskhein). Love is the passion of facticity in which man bears this nonbelonging and darkness, appropriating (adsuefacit) them while guarding them as such. Love is thus not, as the dialectic of desire suggests, the affirmation of the self in the negation of the loved object; it is, instead, the passion and exposition of facticity itself and of the irreducible impropriety of beings. In love, the lover and the beloved come to light in their concealment, in an eternal facticity beyond Being. (This is perhaps what Hannah Arendt means when, in a text written with her first husband in 1930, she cites Rilke, saying that love "is the possibility for each to veil his destiny to the other.")
Just as in Ereignis, the appropriation of the improper signifies the end both of the history of Being and of the history of epochal sendings, so in love the dialectic of the proper and the improper reaches its end. This, finally, is why there is no sense in distinguishing between authentic love and inauthentic love, heavenly love and pandemios love, the love of God and self-love. Lovers bear the impropriety of love to the end so that the proper can emerge as the appropriation of the free incapacity that passion brings to its end. Lovers go to the limit of the improper in a mad and demonic promiscuity; they dwell in carnality and amorous discourse, in forever-new regions of impropriety and facticity, to the point of revealing their essential abyss. Human beings do not originally dwell in the proper; yet they do not (according to the facile suggestion of contemporary nihilism) inhabit the improper and the ungrounded. Rather, human beings are those who fall properly in love with the improper, who--unique among living beings--are capable of their own incapacity.
This is why if it is true that, according to Jean-Luc Nancy's beautiful phrase, love is that of which we are not masters, that which we never reach but which is always happening to us, it is also true that man can appropriate this incapacity and that, to cite Hölderlin's words to Casimir Ulrich Böhlendorff, der freie Gebrauch des Eigenen das Schwerste ist, the free use of the proper is the most difficult task.

Notes:
1.
W Koepps, Merimna und Agape, Seeberg Festschrift ( 1929).

2.
Ludwig Binswanger, Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins ( Zurich: M. Nichans, 1942).

3.
Karl Jaspers, Notizen zu Martin Heidegger ( Munich: Piper, 1978), p. 34.

4.
Karl Löwith, "Phänomenologische Ontologie und protestantische Theologie," in Otto Pöggeler, ed., Heidegger: Perspektiven zur Deutung seines Werkes ( Köln: Kiepenheuer and Witsch, 1970), p. 76.

5.
See Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt: For the Love of the World ( New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 247.

6.
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson ( New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 492; the original is in Martin Heidegger , Sein und Zeit ( Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1928), p. 139.

7.
Martin Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, trans. Michael Heim ( Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 134; the original is in Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 26: Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz ( Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1978), p. 169.

8.
Ibid., English pp. 130-31; original pp. 163-64.


9.
Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 88; original in Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 61.

10.
Oskar Becker, "Mathematische Existenz, Untersuchung zur Logik und Ontologie mathematischer Phänomene," Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung 7 ( 1927): 621.

11.
In Heidegger Gesamtausgabe (vol. 62), the title of the course appears as "Ontologie: Phänomenologische Hermeneutik der Faktizität." According to the note on p. 72 of Sein und Zeit ( Being and Time, p. 490), Heidegger was already concerned with "the hermeneutics of facticity" in his 1919-20 winter semester lectures.

12.
See the entry under facticius in the Thesaurus linguae latinae and the entry under factio in Ernout-Meillet's etymological dictionary.

13.
Otto Pöggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers ( Pfullingen: Neske, 1963), pp. 36-45. See also Oskar Becker, Dasein und Dawesen ( Pfullingen: Neske, 1963), and K. Lehmann, "Christliche Geschichtserfahrung und ontologische Frage beim jungen Heidegger," in Pöggeler, ed., Heidegger: Perspektiven, pp. 140-68. [Since the first publication of the present essay, Heidegger's 1921 lecture course has been published in Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 60: Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens ( Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1995), pp. 160-299, under the title "Augustinus und der Neuplatonismus."--Ed.]

14.
The Augustinian opposition between uti (using something with a view to other ends) and frui (enjoying something for itself) is important for the prehistory of the distinction between Vorhandenheit, "present-at-handness," and Zuhandenheit, "ready-to-handness," in Heidegger Being and Time. As we will see, Dasein's facticity is opposed both to Vorhandenheit and to Zuhandenheit and therefore cannot properly speaking be the object of either a frui or an uti.
15.
Saint Augustine, Confessions, trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin ( London: Penguin Books, 1961), pp. 229-30.

16.
Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 61: Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung ( Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1985), p. 99.

17.
See the observations in H. Tietjen, "Philosophie und Faktizität," Heidegger Studies 2 ( 1986).

18.
Heidegger, Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles, p. 130.

19.
Ibid., p. 131.


20.
Heidegger, "Problem der Faktizität--'kinesis'-Problem" (Problem of facticity, kinesis-problem), ibid., p. 117. If one recalls the fundamental role that kinesis, according to Heidegger, played in Aristotle's thought (in his seminars at Le Thor, Heidegger still spoke of kinesis as the fundamental experience of Aristotle's thought), one can also evaluate the central place of facticity in the thought of the early Heidegger.

21.
Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 82; original in Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, pp. 55-56.

22.
Ibid., English p. 174; original pp. 134-46.


23.
Ibid., English p. 175; original p. 136.


24.
The analogy is, of course, purely formal. But the fact that Heideggerian ontology coincides with the territory of psychology is important for its position in the history of the "question of Being" (Seinsfrage).

25.
Heidegger, Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 136; original in Heidegger , Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik, p. 171.

26.
The word Weise (which derives from the same root as the German wissen and the Latin videre) must be considered as a terminus technicus of Heidegger's thought. In his 1921-22 winter lectures, Heidegger plays on all the possible meanings of the verb weisen and its derivations: "Leben bekommt jeweils eine Grundweisung und es wächst in eine solche hinein. . . . Bezugssinn je in einer Weise ist in sich ein Weisen und hat in sich eine Weisung, die das Leben sich gibt, die es erfährt: Unterweisung." Heidegger, Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles, p. 98.

27.
Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 67; original in Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 42.

28.
In the "Letter on Humanism," Heidegger explicitly refutes this interpretation of the essentia/existentia relation: "It would be the ultimate error if one wished to explain the sentence about man's ek-sistent essence as if it were the secularized transference to human beings of a thought that Christian theology
expresses about God (Deus est suum esse); for ek-sistence is not the realization of an essence nor does ek-sistence itself even effect and posit what is essential" (in Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell [ New York: Harper San Francisco, 1977], p. 207; the original is in Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 9: Wegmarken [ Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1976], pp. 158-59). Another passage in the same text shows that the relation between existence and essence remained a fundamental question in Heidegger's thought even after Being and Time. "In Being and Time no statement about the relation of essentia and existentia can yet be expressed since there it is still a question of preparing something precursory" ( Basic Writings, p. 209; original in Wegmarken, p. 329).


29.
A genealogy of the contraction of essentia and existentia effected by Heidegger would show that this relation has often been conceived in the history of philosophy as something far more complex than a simple opposition. Without discussing Plato (who in the Seventh Letter explicitly states that on and poion are indissociable), we may consider Aristotle's ti en einai from the same perspective. Moreover, the notion of Stoic substance, idios poionf , implies precisely the paradox of a "being-such" (poion) that would be proper. Victor Goldschmidt thus shows that the "manners of Being" (pos ekhein) do not constitute an extrinsic determination of substance but instead reveal substance and exemplify it (they "do its gymnastics," according to Epictetus's beautiful image). The relation between Spinoza's definition of causa sui (cuius essentia involvit existentiam) and Heidegger's determination of Dasein (das Wesen des Daseins liegt in seiner Existenz) remains to be considered.

30.
The observation is L. Amoroso's; see his "La Lichtung di Heidegger come lucus a non lucendo," in Il pensiero debole, ed. Gianni Vattimo and Pier Aldo Rovatti ( Milan: Feltrinelli, 1983), pp. 137-63.

31.
See Jacques Derrida, "Geschlecht," in Martin Heidegger: Cahiers de l'Herne ( Paris: Éditions de l'Herne, 1983), pp. 571-96.

32.
Heidegger, Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 137; original in Heidegger , Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik, p. 173. In the same text, Heidegger relates Dasein's facticity to its spatiality (Räumlichkeit). If one considers that the word Streuung derives from the same root as the Latin sternere (stratum), which refers to extension and horizontality, it is possible to see in this ursprüngliche Streuung one of the reasons for the irreducibility of Dasein's spatiality to its temporality, which is affirmed at the end of "Zeit und Sein (On Time and Being)".

33.
One thus reads "Faitisse estoit et avenante / je ne sais femme plus plaisante," in the Romance of the Rose, "voiz comme elles se chaucent bien et faitissement," in Jean de Meun; "votre gens corps votre beauté faictisse," in Baudes; "ils ont doubz regard et beaulté / et jeunesse et faitischeté," in Gaces. But the true meaning of the word faitis can best be seen in Villon's text, in which he writes, "Hanches charnues, / eslevées, propres, faictisses / à tenir amoureuses lisses."
34.
The word Urfetischismus is obviously to be taken in an ontological, and not a psychological, sense. It is because facticity originally belongs to Dasein that it can encounter something like a fetish in the strict sense of the term. On the status of the fetish in §17 of Being and Time, see Werner Hamacher important observations in "Peut-être la question," in Les fins de l'homme: A partir du travail de Jacques Derrida ( Paris: Galilée, 1981), pp. 353-54.

35.
" Dasein exists factically. We shall inquire whether existentiality and facticity have an ontological unity, or whether facticity belongs essentially to existentiality" ( Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 225); "Das Dasein existiert faktisch. Gefragt wird nach der ontologischen Einheit von Existentialität und Faktizität, bzw. der wesenhaften Zugehörigkeit dieser zu jener" ( Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 181).

36.
Ibid., English p. 264 ; original p. 222.


37.
Ibid., English p. 224 ; original p. 179.


38.
Ibid., English p. 345 ; original p. 299.


39.
Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche: The Will to Power as Art, trans. David Farrell Krell , p. 45; the original is in Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. 1 (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961), p. 55.

40.
Ibid., English p. 47 ; original p. 58.


41.
Ibid., English pp. 47-48 ; original pp. 58-59.


42.
Heidegger, Basic Writings, p. 238; original in Wegmarken, pp. 360-61.

43.
Ibid., English p. 196 ; original pp. 316-17.


44.
Martin Heidegger, The Essence of Reasons (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1969), p. 115; original in Wegmarken, pp. 168-69.

45.
Ibid., English p. 129 ; original p. 174.


46.
Heidegger, Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, pp. 215-16; original in Heidegger , Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik, pp. 279-80.

47.
Martin Heidegger, Aristotle's Metaphysics Omega 1-3, trans. Walter Brogan and Peter Warnek ( Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 94; the original is in Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 33: Aristoteles; Metaphysik Theta 1-3: Vom Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft ( Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1981), p. 114.

48.
Heidegger, Essence of Reasons, pp. 129-31; original in Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 175.

49.
Martin Heidegger, On Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh ( New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 41; the original is in Martin Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969), p. 44.

50.
Ibid., English p. 30 ; original p. 32. The thought expressed here is so disconcerting that the English, French, and Italian translators did not want to admit what is, nevertheless, clear: namely, that the word entwachen in this context cannot mean the same thing as erwachen. In this passage, Heidegger establishes an opposition that is perfectly symmetrical with that between Enteignis and Ereignis.
51.
Ibid., English p. 41 ; original p. 44.


52.
Ibid.

53.
Martin Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, trans. John N. Anderson and E. Hans Freund ( New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 56; the original is in Martin Heidegger, Gelassenheit (Pfullingen: Neske, 1959), p. 24.

54.
Heidegger, On Time and Being, p. 24; original in Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 25.